There is no perfect property. Every gain in security is paid for in yield, and every additional basis point of return is bought with risk or illiquidity. The investors who do best in German food retail are not those who find a flawless asset — none exists — but those who know precisely which compromise they are making and what it is worth. This final part distils the series into seven tests that institutional and private buyers apply to "core" supermarket property, explains why the best assets go to the fastest decision-makers — and sets out what even the best asset cannot protect against.
Key takeaways
• Core property combines a long lease to a first-class tenant, an enduring location and high building quality; its return comes from income, not from speculation.
• Each of the seven tests can be checked against documents and data — most of them in outline before a letter of intent, all of them before the purchase contract is signed.
• "Core-plus" does not mean "core and more": at least one core attribute is missing, which can be acceptable if the price reflects it. On €500,000 of rent, the step from core-plus to prime is worth €1.5 million.
• Demand for genuine core supermarkets usually exceeds supply, so preparation and speed are a competitive advantage. But core protects the income, not the price: prime yields for retail parks (Fachmarktzentren) have risen by 1.25 percentage points since the end of 2021.
A store is core only if it passes all seven tests
Each test can be checked against documents and data — most of them in outline before a letter of intent, all of them before the purchase contract is signed.
Exhibit 1. Each test has a documentary check and recognisable warning signs
Core-plus means more risk, not more upside
Real estate investors describe risk in four tiers — core, core-plus, value-add and opportunistic — of which the first three matter most for supermarkets. Core assets meet all of the tests above and are bought for stable, predictable income. Core-plus assets miss at least one — a shorter remaining lease term, a slightly weaker location, a tenant outside the top tier — and require some active management. Value-add assets need real work: re-letting, refurbishment or repositioning.
Core-plus is often marketed as "core with extra upside". That is the wrong way round: the "plus" refers to the additional risk, for which the investor should receive additional yield. Bought at the right price, core-plus can be an excellent investment. Bought at a core price, it is an overpriced asset.
The market prices that difference in multiples of rent. At the end of 2025, BNP Paribas Real Estate put purchase-price multiples for supermarkets and discounters at up to 18.5 times annual rent for prime stores (the best of core), 15.5 for core-plus and 12.5 for value-add. On €500,000 of rent, the step from core-plus to prime is worth €1.5 million. Core-plus is no niche — it took 44% of food-retail investment in 2025 — but an investor who pays the prime multiple for a core-plus store is paying €1.5 million for an attribute the store does not have.
Preparation, not haste, wins the best off-market stores
In our experience, the best off-market opportunities are allocated within days, not weeks, and go to buyers who can:
- confirm their structure (Part 9) and source of funds (Part 8) before the first viewing;
- commission due diligence (Part 7) immediately and decide on its findings;
- demonstrate financing certainty, or no need for financing;
- accept a fair price rather than test the seller with a low first offer.
Scarcity sets the pace. New stores that pass all seven tests are rare, and the investors looking for them are many: family offices, private investors, specialist funds, developers keeping assets for their own families and the retailers themselves (Part 4).
Speed is not recklessness. It is preparation done in advance — so that, when the right asset appears, the remaining work is verification rather than discovery.
Core protects the income, not the price
The case for food-retail property rests on a simple observation: people need food and everyday goods every day. Demand for them is structurally non-cyclical. Online sales still account for only 4.9% of German spending on food and drugstore goods (HDE, 2025) — small, but not static: they grew by 10.4% that year. The quick-commerce start-ups that promised to replace the supermarket largely retreated within four years (Part 1). Store formats, payment methods and consumer tastes will continue to change — and leases, energy standards and store layouts will change with them.
Germany adds something few markets can match: none of its four leading food retailers is listed on a stock exchange or owned by private equity. Two are cooperatives of independent merchants and two belong to foundations set up by their founding families (Part 2); their owners answer to members and families, not to quarterly results. EDEKA's first purchasing cooperative was founded in Berlin in 1898, and the group has traded through two world wars, hyperinflation, reunification and a pandemic.
It is difficult to imagine a functioning German economy in which its largest food retailers stop paying rent for the stores that carry their names; were it to happen, unpaid rent would be the least of an investor's problems. The risks that do materialise are quieter. Tenants outside the leading groups can fail: Schlecker, then Europe's largest drugstore chain, filed for insolvency in 2012. When a large chain is broken up, the outcome is decided store by store: after Metro sold the Real hypermarket chain in 2020, the buyer announced plans to sell more than half of its roughly 270 stores to Kaufland and EDEKA and to close about 30 for lack of prospects.
Secure income does not fix the price either. BNP Paribas Real Estate's net prime yield for retail parks (Fachmarktzentren) rose from 3.50% at the end of 2021 to 4.75% in September 2026 — at an unchanged rent, about a quarter off the value.
For investors whose first objective is to preserve capital across generations, German food retail offers something rare: income that is unusually secure. It cannot make the price immune to interest rates, or any location permanent. A core supermarket is bought for its first lease and owned for its second. The tenant's signature carries the first. The location and the building decide whether there will be a second — and the price paid decides whether it will be enough.
Implications for investors
1. Verify all seven tests before the purchase contract is signed. Check most of them in outline before a letter of intent, and prepare the structure, the source of funds and the financing in advance, so that the remaining work is verification rather than discovery.
2. Pay a core price only for a store that passes every test. On €500,000 of rent, paying the prime multiple for a core-plus store means paying €1.5 million for an attribute the store does not have.
3. Underwrite the second lease, not only the first. Test whether the location and the building will keep the store viable after the first lease expires, and do not count on secure income to fix the price.
The series at a glance: 1. Germany's food-retail market · 2. The Big Four · 3. How new stores are developed · 4. Who invests and why · 5. Metropolis or market town · 6. Forward deals vs completed assets · 7. Due diligence · 8. The notarial closing · 9. The structure decision: GmbH and tax · 10. Operating costs · 11. Net cash to the investor · 12. The seven tests.
Sources: Gordon Real Estate Group transaction experience; BNP Paribas Real Estate, Retail-Investmentmarkt Deutschland Q4 2021 and Q3 2026 and Grocery-Investmentmarkt Deutschland Q4 2024 and Q4 2025; HDE Online-Monitor 2026 (3 June 2026); EDEKA Group company history; press reports on Getir's exit from Germany (2024), the Schlecker insolvency (2012) and the sale of Real (2020). As of October 2026.
Photo: Gemma C / Unsplash
This article is general information and not investment, legal or tax advice. Past resilience of tenants or asset classes is no guarantee of future performance.